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Less Than I Wanted to Know:  Why Do Ben-Shahar and Schneider Attack Only 
“Mandated” Disclosure? 
A Comment on Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW:  THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Princeton 2014) 
 
      by Margaret Jane Radin∗ 
           mjradin@umich.edu 
  
 
     
Introduction 
 
This book is intended as a disclosure that disclosure –in the US--doesn’t work.  
According to the authors, as their title tells us, disclosure is a “failure.” The authors say 
that the (or a) purpose of the book is to persuade legislators and other regulatory actors to 
give up on mandated disclosure.1 The book is a well-elaborated jeremiad about the 
inefficacy of mortgage forms, health forms, and forms of all kinds that are routinely 
delivered to consumers.  The authors offer detailed chapters documenting that disclosures 
are ineffective because recipients are largely illiterate, innumerate, heuristically biased, 
and overloaded. The jeremiad is impressive--passionate and thorough--but as I will 
describe in Section I below, it paints with too broad a brush.   
Moreover, the reader is left wondering what can be done to improve matters. The 
book gives the impression that disclosure is inherently and for all time a “failure”—
though the authors must mean at least that its “failure” is to some extent contingent upon 
current economic, political, and social conditions in the US.  And although the authors 
want politicians and other regulators to renounce disclosure, they don’t say how they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ Henry King Ransom Professor, University of Michigan Law School, and Faculty of Law 
Distinguished Research Scholar, University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
1 “This	  book	  was	  written	  to	  persuade	  lawmakers	  not	  to	  use	  a	  failed	  regulatory	  method.”	   
MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, p. 182	  
1
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expect them to be persuaded to give up on it—perhaps not just by reading a book 
“disclosing” that disclosure is a failure.  Indeed, if this book proves helpful in improving 
matters with regard to consumer transactions, then it will have shown paradoxically that 
disclosure does work, at least sometimes, and for some segments of the population.  If 
disclosure works for consumers of books like this, we could ask what characteristics of 
consumers of books like this make the book effective, and what distinguishes its effective 
disclosure from ineffective disclosures that the authors have in their sights.2  
In addition to the authors’ evident choice not to spend time on what might be 
done to improve the situation caused by the “failure” they see, the authors also chose to 
spend little time on disclosure initiated by private parties—that is, the non-mandated 
disclosure by the powerful firms that deliver mass-market fine-print terms to their 
customers, disclosing that the firms are holding customers to harsh terms and are deleting 
important legal rights.  These fine-print forms are alleged to be contracts.  Both types of 
disclosure, either mandated by regulation or generated by private entities themselves, 
suppose that people should be allowed to “choose” what terms to subject themselves to.  
The authors are aware that mandated disclosures are often developed in attempts to limit 
the abuses caused by these fine-print contracts, but chose not to offer solutions to the 
problem of abusive contracts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 One thing that distinguishes this book from mandated disclosure is that its disclosure is not 
mandated—no regulatory body decreed its creation.  Should that make a difference?  Although 
the authors occasionally critique deceptive contracts deployed by firms, the authors seem to have 
largely retained an unexamined faith that disclosure produced by markets is better than disclosure 
produced by government. Yet firms deploying fine-print rights deletions of their own devising are 
often doing their best to gouge consumers or to cancel their legal rights, whereas the regulatory 
mandated disclosures often represent attempts --unless captured by the regulated firms--to 
prevent firms from doing so. (Thanks to Oren Bar-Gill for conversation on this point.) 
2
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The thrust of Ben-Shahar’s and Schneider’s book is that the choice—thus the 
individual autonomy supposedly promoted by mandated disclosure--is largely fictional. 
As I will mention in Section II below, so is the choice--thus the individual autonomy--
supposedly promoted when consumers are said to agree to fine-print rights deletions they 
receive routinely from purveyors of goods and services. Because it seems that disclosure 
lacks efficacy when the fine print is generated by firms on their own, at least to the same 
extent and perhaps to a greater extent than when the fine print is mandated by regulators, 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider seem to assume, at least some of the time, that when the fine 
print is generated wholly by private firms, it is more justified or useful to consumers.  
This apparent position must be examined. 
 
 I.  Illiteracy, Innumeracy, Lack of Salience, and “Overwhelm” 
The sad facts about widespread illiteracy and innumeracy in the US cannot be 
denied.  Neither can the rising wealth inequality--which makes me think of what has 
happened in the last 30 years as trickle-up rather than trickle-down--and its effects on the 
poor, undereducated, underemployed, and hungry. There’s no question in my mind that 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider are right in their elaborate disclosure of the various reasons 
people don’t and can’t read many disclosures and wouldn’t understand many of them if 
they did read them.3  Their research is detailed and compelling. 
The fact that fine print is not read is certainly known to firms, and it’s fair to infer 
that many of them are taking advantage of that fact.  As Ben-Shahar and Schneider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  At page 73-75 the authors include a list of the reasons why recipients don’t read fine 
print and wouldn’t understand it if they did read it. There’s a similar list in my own book, 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE:  THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (Princeton 2013), at 12. 	  
3
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realize, such advantage-taking is one of the reasons that regulators have tried to counter 
with mandated disclosures.  Ben-Shahar’s and Schneider’s jeremiad against mandated 
disclosure is very well written and well calculated to give pause to those who would think 
that merely disclosing matters will solve problems of consumer awareness. I found 
especially convincing the detailed portrayal of Chris Consumer, who has no life to lead 
because all his time is taken up with reading disclosures.4 (This is a condition that the 
authors called “overload” and I will call “overwhelm.”)  I am someone who reads the fine 
print and writes about it,5 but if I were to read all of it that I receive, I wouldn’t be able to 
lead a normal life.  And even though I am a lawyer familiar with this matter, I would not 
be certain of the effects of all of the provisions anyway.  	  
Nevertheless, I think the jeremiad occasionally paints with a too broad a brush.   
 
 A. Example:  Food Labeling 
Food labeling, for example, is not as harmful as the time-wasting piles of forms 
that we cannot escape and that deprive us of important rights in the midst of interminable 
irrelevant disclosures. Yet the authors attack food labeling as just another form of failed 
disclosure, apparently just as bad as all other forms of disclosure. The authors don’t make 
clear that food labeling saves many of us from hours and days of pain and sickness 
caused by allergies or sensitivities to ingredients that in the past we weren’t able to find 
out were in our food. In the case of peanut allergies, food labeling even saves some 
people, including many children, from death. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, chapter 7. 
5 See note 3, supra, and Section II, infra. 
4
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Buying food in the grocery store in the old days was a crapshoot for those of us 
with allergies—will this make me sick or won’t it? Nowadays people who need to know 
what’s in their food can actually shop in a regular grocery store and buy regular brands, 
rather than shop in a specialty store or do without. Surely this is a boon rather than a 
hindrance to retail marketing, so food labeling (it seems to me) is not readily attackable 
on economic efficiency grounds.  Neither is it attackable on grounds that it’s useless—at 
least, not to consumers as a whole, because it’s very important to some, and indeed I 
believe has saved lives. 
Calorie count disclosure in restaurants and other eating establishments, which the 
authors also attack, is likewise not so awful as manipulative fine print accompanying a 
credit card, or mortgage machinations that disguise exorbitant fees or balloon payments 
that can result in loss of one’s house.  Food package labeling and restaurant calorie count 
statements share attributes that make them distinguishable from other failed disclosures at 
which the authors rightly take aim.  If non-readers who know they are not allergic fail to 
read the labels and fail to learn what is in their food, their failure to read doesn’t harm 
them; those disclosures can be safely ignored, so the non-reading is not “failure” in the 
sense the authors mean to attack.  Analogously, if non-readers in a food establishment fail 
to learn how many calories their burger contains, the failure to read does not result, 
irretrievably after this one encounter, in a devastating loss such as bankruptcy or loss of 
their property.  
There is some difference between general ingredient food labels in the grocery 
store and calorie counts either on such labels or in restaurants. Food labels regarding 
allergens can be safely ignored by those who don’t suffer from allergies.  Calorie counts 
5
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can be initially ignored by those who don’t care about them, and are useful to those of us 
who do care about them,6 but it is apparently dangerous, at least to many people, to 
ignore them consistently and in the long run. The purpose of disclosing calories is to 
make it easier for us to avoid obesity and diabetes by maintaining healthy weight, if we 
care to  do so; and in the long run, for the sake of disease prevention and social welfare, 
we hope that more people will care. The public health consequences of over-consumption 
of foods too heavy in calories—which, as Ben-Shahar and Schneider remind us, 
especially impact those who cannot afford better food--are severely costly for individuals 
and for society as a whole. Yet in this case there is a longer run.  One instance of failure 
to heed calorie count is not like one instance of failure to understand an adjustable 
mortgage or a balloon payment.  In the longer run we can hope for public education to 
take hold. If people don’t pay attention to calorie disclosures on their initial encounter 
with them, it doesn’t threaten to bankrupt them or cause them to lose their property from 
that one encounter, as credit card practices or obscure balloon payments can. 
In short, food labeling is easy to ignore by those who don’t want to pay attention 
to it, and it’s very valuable to others. At the present time, calorie counts may be more 
valuable to wealthy people who can afford better food and who might be better educated 
about what food is actually better; but at least in the case of serious allergies, food 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The authors say twice that restaurants must disclose calorie count, MORE THAN YOU 
WANTED TO KNOW at 28 and 133, but it’s not true in the places I frequent. (I wish it 
were.) New York City pioneered calorie-count disclosure in 2009, and some states, such 
as California, followed suit. Under a provision of the US federal health law enacted in 
2010, chains of more than 20 outlets are supposed to post calorie counts, but it doesn’t 
seem that compliance has been widespread, and the FDA has failed to issue regulations.  
See, e.g, David Lazarus, Restaurants Skip Required Nutrition Info; Officials Choose Not 
to Care, Los Angeles Times, Business Section, April 28, 2014.	  
6
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labeling is beneficial to everyone who suffers from them (including parents of allergic 
children), not just to wealthy people.  
So food labeling is one portion of the authors’ jeremiad that could have been more 
nuanced. The authors could have considered the difference between, on the one hand, 
fine print that can easily be ignored by those who have no need to know what is 
disclosed, while being extremely useful to those who do need it, and, on the other hand, 
fine print that is ignored once at the recipient’s peril.   
 
                    B.  General Comments on Elaborating the Model(s) 
On a more general level, the authors would have done well to have been more 
attentive to differentiation among different features of disclosures. Attention to nuance 
and differentiations may have dampened the righteous fury of the jeremiad, but it might 
have led to more of the target audience being convinced. 
1.  Salience. When the disclosure is salient to the recipient, many recipients will 
have learned how to look for it and understand it (such as presence of peanuts to someone 
who will go into anaphylactic shock if she consumes a peanut).  What is salience?  That 
term refers to aspects of circumstances that are likely to strike a person’s attention.7 The 
authors include a chapter explaining the change in thinking about human decision making 
owing to the psychology discoveries of Kahneman & Tversky, and others.8  They do so 
primarily to show that many disclosures don’t work because their terms are not salient. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As psychological research has revealed to us, human decision making often does not take into 
account all important features of a situation, but only those that are easy for us to see, such as 
those that fit in with our background presumptions, or those that are easily comparable with 
things that we know.  See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 
(2012).  As mentioned below, Section II, this breakthrough in the psychology of decision making 
is changing the paradigm of economics that previously assumed a rationality that does not exist. 8	  MORE	  THAN	  YOU	  WANTED	  TO	  KNOW,	  ch.	  7.	  
7
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Problems that will arise later, or perhaps never happen to us, such as possible bankruptcy 
if interest rates rise and we have an adjustable mortgage, tend not to be salient, whereas 
the immediate cheap teaser rate is salient.  So it would have been a good idea to 
distinguish clearly between types of disclosures that are salient to consumers and those 
that are not.   
2. Avoiding practices that trigger biases. The authors are aware that firms left to 
their own devices often use fine-print terms that take advantage of consumers’ heuristic 
biases. But they might have been clearer that when mandated disclosure is intended as a 
corrective to this sort of advantage-taking, mandated disclosure could  more consciously 
try to avoid unwittingly making the same error about salience as firms may do 
purposefully. 
 There are better and worse ways for disclosures to take account of heuristic 
biases and how they render important factors non-salient to consumers, some of which 
have been explored and some of which no doubt remain to be explored. Oren Bar-Gill 
has opened a very fruitful discussion by explaining how cell phone providers, credit card 
providers, and mortgage providers deliberately take advantage of well-understood 
heuristic biases of consumers to render certain terms non-salient.9  Regulators can and 
should use this understanding not only to create disclosure documents or mandates for 
firms that succeed in achieving actual disclosure, but indeed to disallow certain practices 
that have previously been allowable if “disclosed.”10  Such practices include terms that 
disclose harms for things that consumers believe will never befall them, such as usurious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012). 
10 In the end, Ben-Shahar and Schneider do not rule out this result, but they refer to it as a “choice 
between libertarianism and paternalism.” MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW at 192.  As 
I will argue below, Section II, this is not a perspicuous description of the matter. 
8
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interest rates after initial teaser rates, automatic deductions for endless renewals of 
subscription services, and outrageous fees for things consumers think they won’t do, such 
as pay late or bounce a check. 
3.  Illiteracy. People who do not read well might be more amenable to oral or 
online disclosures, with the opportunity to ask questions. This is something that is easier 
to do online, and many firms that really, really want recipients to understand their terms 
have worked out ways of doing this, such as open telephone lines or online chat lines.  
Or, in addition to mandated disclosure, regulators could tell firms that certain terms must 
be adequately disclosed, and require the firms to submit evidence that their customers do 
understand the terms. Indeed, regulators could require firms to submit such evidence 
without mandating any particular disclosure as a way to accomplish that understanding.11 
4.  Innumeracy. Many people in the US are more innumerate than illiterate.  
(Some of my elite law students are graduates of prestigious colleges, but still object to 
numerical examples.) Disclosures that ask consumers to understand numbers might be 
worse than those that ask them to understand words, at least if the words are at a suitable 
level of literacy.  If those who write disclosures understand this, they can make warnings 
more understandable to many people, even if not to all. 
5. Disclosure can probably be made helpful to some, if not all. To generalize, it 
seems to be an overstatement or at least premature to think or imply that no matter how 
hard they try, and no matter what the field in issue, regulators cannot produce a 
disclosure that is helpful to at least some people. In the US, the recently established 
Consumer Financial Protection Board (CPFB) conducted experiments to find out which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law (2014)(unpublished draft on file 
with author) 
9
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kinds of financial disclosures people can understand.12 It’s too early to predict that such 
experiments will result in nothing but failures of disclosure.  The failure of disclosure that 
the authors’ research demonstrates could be relative, at least in some cases, to the kinds 
of disclosures that have previously been used. 
The CPFBs one-page mortgage disclosure form, produced after laboratory 
experimentation with consumers, will be helpful to at least some people. The failure of 
disclosure in the past is not only more serious and more widespread in some fields than in 
others, it is not an absolute that must remain unshaken in the future.  Now that Ben-
Shahar and Schneider have opened up the field, more research is needed.  How much of 
the serious and widespread failure of disclosure is due to wealth disparity and lack of 
education?  How much of the failure is due to lack of salience of harmful terms?  How 
much of the failure is due simply to “overwhelm”—the fact that we are inundated with 
documents purporting to affect our rights?  
The circumstances of wealth disparity and lack of education can change, we hope.  
The situation of lack of salience might be somewhat ameliorated by requiring that 
important terms be foregrounded.  Yet there are important terms that human decision 
makers cannot stop ignoring even if foregrounded (such as deletion of legal remedies), 
and these are the terms that should be prohibited rather than merely disclosed.  The 
“overwhelm” situation would be slightly ameliorated if the consumers most affected by 
lousy mortgages and usurious credit cards were not those whose income levels force 
them to work two or three low-paying jobs with no spare time to think, much less read 
documents.  It will be important in the future to study which of these factors (and others 
that may be discerned) are the most relevant to which kinds of disclosures. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE, at 194-96 (2014). 
10
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                  II. Failed Disclosure by Private Firms 
If disclosure fails because US consumers cannot read and understand fine print, 
and because they are inundated with it, and because many of its terms are not salient to 
them, it fails at least as badly—or worse-- in transactions between a firm and consumers 
in which the firm has designed its own fine print as it does when a firm has some of its 
fine print mandated by law. In other words, fine print in “private” contracts fails just as 
much in efficacy, and for the same reasons, as does fine print in mortgage disclosures and 
others required by regulatory bodies.  The authors realize that regulatory disclosure 
mandates are often utilized in an attempt to curtail the worst offenses in privately 
designed boilerplate that is harmful to consumers. But it seems that the authors might, 
rather tacitly, be regarding fine print in purported contracts to be nevertheless more 
justifiable than fine print in regulatory disclosures.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In previous work, one of the authors of MORE THAN YOU KNOW, Ben-Shahar, endorsed the 
old-style law-and-economics reasoning that consumers are being compensated for loss of their 
rights and that this could be understood as “rational”.  For example, he endorsed the idea that an 
appropriate coterie of savvy consumers could set the market price for everyone in the market, so 
that consumers would be paying the correct market price for a product that consisted of a 
functional component plus a fine-print rights-deletion component, and indeed that the non-
reading consumers would be “cross-subsidized” by the savvy readers. See, e.g., Regulation 
Through Boilerplate: An Apologia (Review of Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law), 112 Michigan Law Review  883, 900 (2014).  In MORE 
THAN YOU KNOW, however, the authors disavow the savvy reader hypothesis, at least as a 
general matter.  Id. at 187ff.   
      The old-style law-and-economics reasoning that Ben-Shahar formerly professed depends 
upon a view of rationality that is inconsistent with the bounded rationality that is now understood 
to characterize human decision making.  A new paradigm of law-and-economics is taking shape 
under the rubric of behavioral economics.  It seems that in this book the authors endorse the new 
paradigm, as one can infer from chapter 7 on the new paradigm of bounded rationality in decision 
making, as well as their critique of the savvy reader hypothesis. But here and there certain tropes 
characteristic of old-style law-and-economics remain: for example, in the mostly tacit distinction 
between mandated disclosures and non-mandated disclosures, and comments that interpret legal 
consumer protection rules as “paternalism.”  See, e.g., text accompanying note 19, infra.   
11
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Ben-Shahar and Schneider do mention that product warnings such as disclosure 
that a product or service may injure the recipient are just as useless as financial or health 
disclosures.  As the authors point out, under the current structure of US tort law, 
disclosure that a lawnmower can cut off your toes likely exonerates the purveyor from the 
liability for marketing a dangerous product.14   
Let’s pause on this point. It’s important that for disclosure of the lawnmower 
kind—“warning, my product may injure you”---it doesn’t much matter whether the 
disclosure purports to be a contract or not.  The result is the same. Traditional contract 
doctrines such as “reasonable opportunity to read” or “duty to read” are useless under 
current conditions.15  Fine print, whether mere disclosure such as the label on the 
lawnmower, or whether labeled “contract” such as the papers signed at a fitness facility, 
can erase rights of redress. This is especially true, at least in many states, of blanket 
disclaimers of liability involving services,16 such as the “we aren’t liable for anything any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, at 168. 
15 Indeed, Ben-Shahar previously took aim at the doctrine of “opportunity to read” and 
presumably his critique would apply a fortiori to “duty to read.” See Ben-Shahar, The Myth of 
Opportunity to Read in Contract Law, 5 European Review of Contract Law 1 (2009). In line 
with a general preference for markets over regulation, however, he suggested that consumers 
should rely only on their own private actions (such as creating groups that could injure a firm’s 
reputation), whereas the unreadable fine print should nevertheless be enforceable by the firm as a 
contract. See Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection Without Law, 6 European 
Review of Contract Law 221 (2010). 16	  Note that under the US law regulating contracts for the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC), such exculpation from personal injury harm to a consumer would be presumptively 
unconscionable when the item sold is a product. UCC 2-719. But in the US we don’t have a 
parallel provision for services. So purported contracts, amounting to disclosures, tell consumers 
that the service provider is not liable for any kind of harm.  Every time I get one of these at a 
fitness studio, at a summer music camp, etc, and I tell the friendly people that this is at best 
seriously overreaching, they tell me that their insurance company requires them to do this. I 
suspect that insurers are widely trying to shunt to their insured’s customers the very risk that the 
insurers are supposedly insuring against.   	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of us do to you or your family” paperwork we are required to sign by summer camps, 
daycare providers, fitness facilities, and nursing homes. 
Given the reality that there often isn’t a significant difference between fine print 
that is merely “disclosure” and fine print that is labeled contractual, this book leads to the 
need to pay attention to the question whether (or when) these fine-print terms that come 
with transactions should properly be enforced as contracts.  In other words, why did Ben-
Shahar and Schneider issue a jeremiad against disclosure, but only when it is mandated 
by regulation?  The same facts that the authors marshal, about US illiteracy, innumeracy, 
lack of salience, and general fine-print “overwhelm” apply to the many consumer 
contracts that (in the US) are largely enforceable.  
For example, exculpatory clauses in contracts for services –such as nursing homes 
and daycare centers—purport to deny liability for any and all harm caused by the 
purveyor. A blatant moral hazard problem here is simply ignored.  (The moral hazard is 
that the nursing home will feel free to cut corners on hygiene, maintenance, and other 
aspects of non-negligent performance.) Why does US law mostly allow this if it’s in a 
document called a contract? The problem would be the same if the nursing home 
(perhaps required by regulation) simply “disclosed” to customers—perhaps with a sign 
on the wall-- that their loved one is very likely to die of infected bed sores or bowel 
obstruction.  In fact, they could very well call that sign on the wall a contract.  And that’s 
my point:  there’s not much difference between the disclosures attacked by Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider and the widespread fine-print rights deletions deployed by firms against 
consumers.   
13
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Contract theory, which justifies state coercive enforcement, doesn’t read well on 
this particular segment of contract practice.  That is, contract theory doesn’t justify 
enforcement of mass-market contracts that consist of fine print and contain rights 
deletions that recipients, many thousands of them, perhaps millions of them, cannot read 
and understand--much less have a choice about.  We need a better theory with which to 
regulate when these fine-print rights deletions are enforceable, and we may need to use 
legal structures other than contract law.  
Nuance is needed.  Not all disclosures to consumers are inevitably unreadable and 
useless.  Neither does all contractual fine print relate to rights deletions consumers cannot 
avoid.  Not all contracts made up of sewn-together boilerplate clauses are really 
disclosures—mostly unreadable, non-understandable-- in disguise. Yes, I’ve had a 
medical consent form shoved into my hands while I was on a gurney and the IV was in 
my arm—so what was I going to do, refuse the operation?  But I’ve also entered into an 
individually negotiated contract with a contractor that consisted entirely of sewn-together 
standardized clauses; in this type of circumstance standardization can be very useful. 
The problem that I find most pressing is not standardization itself, but rather 
mass-market deletion of rights to meaningful redress of grievances.  The availability of 
legal redress is essential to civil society, yet not salient to individuals.  No one, at the time 
of purchasing a product, thinks to herself, I had better check into whether legal remedies 
remain available, in case I need to sue someone.  No one thinks she is the unlucky one 
that may be hurt.  That is a bias that is deeply embedded in human decision making. 
So what are we to do about fine-print rights deletions that are important to civil 
society and the rule of law, but that will not be “chosen” (that is, will be thoughtlessly 
14
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waived) by individuals, and not even thought about until the hour of need?  This is 
happening by “mere” disclosure, whether mandated or not mandated; and also by 
contracts, whether their terms are mandated, or not mandated.  I consider mass-market 
rights deletions in private transactions an aspect of “democratic degradation,” because 
when this practice is broadly pursued it undermines certain rights that are basic to the 
existence and maintenance of democracy and civil society.17  Ben-Shahar and Schneider 
note that hardly any individual qua individual “feels degraded” when fine print delivered 
to her contains clauses that in the aggregate undermine democracy and civil society.18 I 
am sure that they are right.  In fact, I’m sure that individuals qua individuals don’t value 
legal remedies, or even think about them (until they need them), because heuristic bias 
makes us all think that the other guy will be the one who gets hurt.  However, it is not 
true that this means that redress is therefore not valuable to individuals.19  
It’s not true because we shouldn’t measure value only by subjective value to an 
individual, just as we shouldn’t measure values as entirely monetizable and available to 
trade-off in a cost-benefit analysis.  I am not urging here merely that social value cannot 
always be perspicuously understood as merely a summing of individual subjective values. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Radin, supra note 3, chapter 3. 
18 MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, at 192. 
19 “Chicago” law-and-economics folks tend to say this repeatedly (see, e.g., Ben-Shahar, supra 
note 13); but, nevertheless, it’s not true.  Civil society can be valuable to individuals whether 
individuals realize it subjectively or not. “Chicago” law-and-economics folks also tend to believe 
that deletion of remedies (for example) is efficient because it saves the firm money and the firm 
will pass on its savings to consumers; and that this is also indicative of consumer autonomy, 
because consumers would (subjectively, ex ante, before it turns out that they are the unlucky ones 
where remedy is needed) prefer to have no remedy but a cheaper price.  For empirical scholars, as 
law-and-economics folks say they are, these propositions would need to be tested in individual 
markets, rather than put forward as blanket generalization. To what extent are savings passed on 
rather than simply pocketed?  And so on.  But, leaving aside the empirical questions, there 
remains the question of value I mention in the text:  legal remedies are valuable to individuals as 
part of the background protection of civil society, whether individuals subjectively realize that or 
not. 
15
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Rather, I want to stress that the availability of redress is valuable to each individual 
whether any individual realizes it subjectively or not.  In the story of why we exit the 
state of nature and maintain a political state, a strong component of the rationale is that 
we cannot watch our backs all the time, and we cannot always have with us our own 
protective group to do battle with predatory others who might want to divest us of 
possessions or life.  That is why I think that certain rights are permanently in the care of 
the polity.  Unfortunately, it’s hard to get to this conclusion if one’s theory of value is 
wholly based not merely on value to individuals, but rather on the subjective feelings or 
awareness of individuals. 
I believe that legislators and responsible agencies should make certain basic rights 
non-waivable, as in the toe-slicing lawnmower example where the use of disclosure 
results in waiver of tort liability.  When they write a consumer protection law, legislators 
should make its significant protections non-waivable—or at least non-waivable by mass-
market fine print.  Ben-Shahar and Schneider are quite correct that default rules (which 
can be “contracted” out of) are mostly useless in this context.20  If for some reason 
legislators cannot make important protections non-waivable, because, for example, their 
election depends on the money supplied by those who would oppose this, then I think that 
common law judges should do it.  Some judges might just be conservative enough to find 
that underlying rights that the polity is supposed to guarantee us are essential to our 
liberty, and to the maintenance of a civil society in which that liberty can flourish. 
Some—perhaps including Ben-Shahar and Schneider-- would call making basic 
rights non-waivable “paternalism,” but in my view this is not perspicuously called 
“paternalism.” Instead it is a recognition of the value of civil society to everyone, and to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, at 190-91. 
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everyone’s liberty.  In my view, thinking of mandates as a choice amounting to a “trade-
off” between “paternalism” and “libertarianism”21 –as law-and-economics advocates 
often do--clings to some old-school law-and-economics habits of thought.22  Liberty may 
be enhanced and not undermined if the state took more responsibility for the matters it 
should.   The “trade-off” formulation would not be the best way to help us think about 
two related questions raised by the failure of disclosure, the theoretical and the practical:  
What exactly is the harm to consumers caused by disclosurism? What is the best way to 
get the political system to do something about the situation? 
 
   Conclusion 
One topic we need to think about is the rights inherent in the idea of civil society, 
those I call permanently in the care of the polity.23  We should confront the fact of 
widespread disclosures—even disclosures masquerading as contracts—that delete basic 
rights of civil society for thousands or millions of people.  People without redress are like 
the legendary people in a state of nature, who are at the mercy of those who would injure 
them unless they have their own means of fighting back.  We can debate when and under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, at 192. 
22 The authors of MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW seem to find themselves in an 
interesting theoretical transition that I think was not consciously confronted at the time of writing. 
See note 13, supra.  As mentioned earlier, see text accompanying notes 7-8, they devote a chapter 
to exploring the tenets of behavioral economics and how its psychological understanding of 
human decisionmaking buttresses an understanding of the failure of disclosure; so they endorse 
the new understanding of bounded rationality. Yet remnants of the previous law-and-economics 
paradigm of rationality remain here and there, such as the idea that there’s a “tradeoff” between 
autonomy and “paternalism” if certain harmful practices are outlawed rather than merely 
disclosed.   Receipt of failed disclosures does not promote autonomous choice. Those who are not 
adherents of old-school “Chicago” tenets are likely to think that individual autonomy is enhanced, 
not undermined, when civil society fulfills its proper role in protecting individuals.	  
23 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate:  A Threat to the Rule of Law, in LISA M. AUSTIN 
AND DENNIS KLIMCHUK, EDS, PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW (forthcoming 
Oxford 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/author=22645 
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what circumstances a right essential to the maintenance of civil society and the rule of 
law should be freely alienable by an individual, because individuals tend not to value the 
background rules of civil society until they need them. But it seems clearer that such 
rights should at least not be divested from thousands or millions of people through mass-
market fine-print contracts that we know that people don’t read and wouldn’t understand 
if they did read. 
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